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INTRODUCTION
Unlike other business relationships, employment relationships typically
are not formalized in a written document. The rights of workers are set largely by
statute and certain baseline common law assumptions, with the role of private
ordering limited to the determination of compensation and job duties. The few
negotiated terms of employment are likely to be memorialized, if at all, in a brief
offer letter or job description.
Recently, however, companies" have gravitated toward the use of
standardized agreements to "contractualize" discrete aspects of workers'
obligations.' Two prominent examples are noncompete and arbitration
agreements. 2 Employers have increasingly demanded the former as a means of
1.
Rachel Arnow-Richman, The Role of Contract in the Modern Employment
Relationship, 10 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REv. 1, 2 (2003).
2.
Other examples include consent forms (such as for criminal background and
credit checks) and recitals of at-will or independent contractor status. I choose to focus on
noncompete and arbitration agreements for several reasons. Although there appears to be no
comparative data on the subject, noncompetes and arbitration agreements are among the
most commonly requested standardized employment contracts. They are also among the
most problematic, given that they restrict employee rights imbued with a public interestthe right to sell one's labor and be free from indentured servitude in the case of
noncompetes, and the right to vindication of statutory and other externally created rights in
a fair and public forum in the case of arbitration agreements. The aggregate effects of both
types of agreements also likely undermine broader social and economic goals. For instance,
the widespread use of noncompetes may restrict healthy economic growth by insulating
employers against competition, while extensive use of arbitration agreements can impede
organic development of law and precedent. Such risks have been weighed and debated by
other scholars and will not be reviewed here. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal
Infrastructure of High Technology Industrial Districts: Silicon Valley, Route 128, and
Covenants Not to Compete, 74 N.Y.U. L. REv. 575, 589-603 (1999) (suggesting that
noncompete enforcement limits information spillovers that are necessary to sustain
economic growth); Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Mandatory Arbitration of Individual
Employment Rights: The Yellow Dog Contract of the 1990s, 73 DENv. U. L. REv. 1017,

1043 (1996) (predicting that privatization of dispute resolution will diminish the body of
authority interpreting discrimination statutes and reduce the educational role of the law in
shaping social norms). Instead, the focus of this Article is on the form that such contracts
take; that is, the practice of using standardized agreements provided on a delayed basis.
In addition, this Article does not consider other sources of contractual rights, such as
employee handbooks and personnel manuals. See, e.g., Woolley v. Hoffinann-La Roche,
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privately augmenting their trade secret rights and extending the tort duty of
employee loyalty,3 while they have used the latter to privatize dispute resolution
and limit employees' access to courts in pursuing claims under statutory
discrimination laws.
The widespread implementation of these targeted documents differs in
important ways from the use of more comprehensive agreements in limited, and
arguably exceptional, subcategories of employment relationships. Written
contracts are the norm among executive and unionized workers who are governed
by heavily negotiated, context-specific instruments that generally provide greater
benefits to these workers than background law requires.5 In contrast, the new
model of private ordering in employment relies on boilerplate documents,
unilaterally drafted by the employer and presented as a condition of employment,
often subsequent to the start of work. Their purpose is not to memorialize a
negotiated set of terms, but to extract waivers of rights, thus realigning statutory
and default rules to better reflect employers' interests.
This trend in private ordering parallels a growing phenomenon in
contracts and commercial law-the problem of "shrinkwrap" contracts limiting the

Inc., 491 A.2d 1257, 1258 (N.J. 1985). Unlike the form of written agreement that is the
focus of this Article, employee handbooks are generally not intended by employers to be
contracts, and indeed, employers routinely include in such documents language expressly
disclaiming their contractual significance. See, e.g., Conner v. City of Forest Acres, 560
S.E.2d 606, 611 (S.C. 2002). In addition, disputes over employee handbooks generally
involve claims that the employer reneged on a promised benefit contained in the handbook,
such as an assurance of for cause termination. See, e.g., id. In contrast, cubewrap contracts,
as I use the term, are invariably formal contracts, which the employer intends to be legally
binding and which aim to diminish employee rights rather than provide additional benefits.
3.
See Rachel Amow-Richman, Cubewrap Contracts and Worker Mobility: The
Dilution of Employee BargainingPower via StandardForm Noncompetes, 2006 MICH. ST.

L. REV. 963, 982-83 (describing how employers draft noncompetes to restrict employee's
use of information not clearly protected under external law).
4.

See Mary Williams Walsh, Ruling Likely to Bring Changes to Many Jobs,

N.Y. TIMES, March 22, 2001, at C6. For collected statistics on the growth in arbitral case
loads among some of the major third-party providers of employment arbitration services,
see generally Maureen A. Weston, Reexamining ArbitralImmunity in an Age of Mandatory
andProfessionalArbitration,88 MINN. L. REV. 449,449-50 (2004).

5.
These two categories of written contracts obviously differ from each other as
well. Executive contracts are individualized agreements that apply only to elite workers,
whereas union contracts are collective agreements that historically have covered primarily
rank-and-file workers. Yet a principal feature of both types of employment contracts is job
security. See Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, An Empirical Analysis of CEO
Employment Contracts: What Do Top Executives Bargain For?, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
231, 246 (2006) (concluding based on empirical review that "overwhelmingly, the CEO
contracts around the at-will default in one way or another"); J. Hoult Verkerke, An
EmpiricalPerspective on Indefinite Term Employment Contracts: Resolving the Just Cause
Debate, 1995 Wis. L. REv. 837, 890 ("One of the many distinguishing features of union
employment is the fact that virtually all collective bargaining agreements include just cause
protection.").
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rights and remedies of consumers. 6 In the consumer context, such transactions
have been a subject of special concern, beyond that associated with contracts of
adhesion generally, because they purport to bind the parties to terms received only
after purchase of the product. 7 What has escaped wide notice in the employment
law literature is that standard form employment agreements frequently follow this
agreement-now-terms-later model of contracting. 8 While employers and
employees dicker over such things as salary, duties, and title, they generally do not
discuss matters like post-termination competition and the method of resolving
future disputes. 9 Documents governing such matters are usually provided to an
employee--or left in his or her cubicle or workspace-after the individual not only
The term "shrinkwrap" contract comes from the practice of wrapping retail
6.
packages in cellophane, making it impossible to access information contained inside until
after purchase. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1449 (7th Cir. 1996). A variety of
other terms have also been used to describe this practice of providing additional contract
terms "in the box." E.g., Jean Braucher, Commentary, Amended Article 2 and the Decision
to Trust the Courts: The Case Against Enforcing Delayed Mass-Market Terms, Especially
for Software, 2004 Wis. L. REv. 753, 753 ("delayed term" transactions); Stephen E.
Friedman, Text and Circumstance: Warranty Disclaimers in a World of Rolling Contracts,
46 ARiz. L. REv. 677, 679 (2004) ("layered contracts"); Robert A. Hillman, Rolling
Contracts, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 743, 744 (2002) ("rolling contracts"). Because I agree with
Professor Braucher that terms like "rolling" or "layered" contracts presuppose that delayed
terms are part of the contract formation process, Braucher, supra, at 757, I will use the
labels "delayed term" or "shrinkwrap" contracts throughout this Article.
7.
Examples from the large body of scholarship on this topic include Braucher,
supra note 6; Jean Braucher, Delayed Disclosure in Consumer E-Commerce as an Unfair
and Deceptive Practice,46 WAYNE L. REv. 1805 (2000); Friedman, supra note 6; Hillman,
supra note 6; William H. Lawrence, Rolling Contracts Rolling Over ContractLaw, 41 SAN
DIEGO L. REv. 1099 (2004); John E. Murray, Jr. & Harry M. Flechtner, The Summer, 1999
Draft of Revised Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code: What Hath NCCUSL
Rejected?, 19 J.L. & COM. 1, 34-37 (1999); Richard E. Speidel, Revising UCC Article 2: A
View from the Trenches, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 607, 616-17 (2001); James J. White, Contracting
Under Amended 2-207, 2004 Wis. L. REv. 723, 736-37; John D. Wladis, The Contract
Formation Sections of the ProposedRevisions to U.C.C. Article 2, 54 SMU L. REv. 997
(2001). For an extensive listserv thread on the topic, see Deborah Ware Post, Preface to the
Gateway Thread, 16 ToURo L. REv. 1145 (2000).
To be clear, many commentators have discussed the adhesive nature of such
8.
agreements, particularly in the arbitration context. See, e.g., David S. Schwartz, Enforcing
Small Print to Protect Big Business: Employee and Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of
Compelled Arbitration, 1997 Wis. L. REv. 33, 36 ("Pre-dispute arbitration clauses.., have
increasingly found their way into standard form contracts of adhesion."); Stone, supra note
2, at 1037 ("[M]andatory arbitration provisions are often imposed on workers without even
the illusion of bargaining or consent."). But they generally have not focused on the
employers' practice of delaying terms and how that affects worker choice.
9.
See U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR & U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, COMMISSION ON THE
FuTURE OF THE WORKER-EMPLOYER RELATIONSHIP, FACT-FINDNG REPORT 118 (May 1994)
("[W]hile the labor market does permit some negotiation and variation in salaries and
benefits, it is hardly likely to let employees insist on litigating, rather than arbitrating, future
legal disputes with their prospective employers."); Schwartz, supra note 8, at 56-57 ("Predispute arbitration clauses ... are, in substance, immaterial to the core of the transaction,
which would typically center around price, or in an employment contract, wages. They thus
receive little attention from the adherent.").
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accepts the company's offer of employment but also actually begins work.' ° For
this reason, I refer to such documents as "cubewrap contracts."''
The proliferation of cubewrap contracts poses a significant challenge to
those who might otherwise support private ordering in setting and policing the
terms of employment relationships. The use of boilerplate language in any context
has long raised questions about the validity of assent and the risk of overreaching
by the drafter, 12 concerns that are heightened where a delay in providing terms
impedes a party's ability to consider the transaction as a whole. In the employment
context, such concerns redouble given the nature of both the relationship and the
market. As compared with a purchase of goods, the individual employee is likely
to have much more at stake in any one "sale" and ultimately has very limited
ability to reject or "return" the job once accepted. These limitations allow
cubewrap contracts to operate underground as a form of private legislation,
rewriting the baseline common law and statutory rules that protect employee rights
and society generally.
This Article draws on commercial law doctrine and literature to call for
an end to cubewrap terms. It argues that the justifications for delayed-term
consumer contracts are inapplicable to cubewrap agreements and that the dangers
of withholding terms are particularly acute in the employment context. It calls for
mandatory disclosure of terms on penalty of non-enforcement, thus providing a
bright-line, formation-based rule voiding cubewrap terms regardless of their
substantive content. Part I provides an overview of the law of delayed-term
commercial contracts and compares judicial treatment of arbitration and
noncompete agreements. 13 Part II discusses the rationale for delayed-term
consumer contracts, as well as the contemporary critique of manufacturers'
contracting practices. 4 It argues that the justifications proposed in support of
delayed-term contracts do not carry over to employment contracts and that the
legitimate concerns raised by critics and consumer rights advocates apply with
even greater force in the employment context. 15 Finally, Part III offers some initial
ideas about the viability of a disclosure requirement as a complement to
substantive regulation in policing cubewrap terms.6

10.
See Matthew T. Bodie, Questions About the Efficiency of Employment
Arbitration Agreements, 39 GA. L. REV. 1, 33 (2004) ("Employers are not likely to highlight
the need for an agreement before employment begins. In fact, such an agreement may only

be included in the paperwork that employees fill out on their first day of work."). For case
examples, see infra note 17 and accompanying text.
11.
See Arnow-Richman, supra note 3, at 966.
12.
See generally Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts
About Freedom of Contract,43 COLUM. L. REV. 629 (1943); Todd D. Rakoff, Contractsof
Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REv. 1173 (1983); W. David Slawson,
StandardForm Contracts and DemocraticControl of Lawmaking Power, 84 HARV. L. REv.
529 (1971).
13.
See infra Part I.A-B.
14.
See infra Part II.A-B.
15.
See infra Part II.A-B.
16.
See infra Part III.A-B.
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I. EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIPS, CONSUMER TRANSACTIONS, AND
THE LAW OF CONTRACT FORMATION
Employment contracts and consumer transactions, at first blush, appear to
have little in common. We think of employment relationships as precisely that,
relationships, whereas consumer transactions are immediate, relatively anonymous
exchanges. Those are important differences to which I shall return, but the ri3e of
cubewrap agreements suggests an area for comparison. Modem employment
contracts resemble consumer transactions in both how and why standard forms are
used. In both contexts, forms are frequently produced only after initial assent to the
transaction or relationship has been given, either enclosed with the product in the
case of consumer purchases or upon beginning work in the case of employment
relationships.1 7 In addition, forms in both contexts are used primarily to extract
waivers of rights from the non-drafting party. Indeed, such waivers often go to the
same types of rights. For example, manufacturers and employers alike use
arbitration agreements to limit individuals' access to courts
in the event of breach
8
of warranty or discriminatory treatment, respectively.'
While these contracts are functionally similar, there is significant
departure in the way courts analyze them.' 9 In the consumer context, the focus is
on whether the deferred terms can become part of the agreement to which the
purchaser has already ostensibly committed. In making this determination, courts
have split over whether the consumer's retention of the product constitutes an

17.
For case examples in the consumer context, see Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc.,
105 F.3d 1147, 1148 (7th Cir. 1997) (arbitration clause received in shipping carton after
credit card purchase of computer by phone); ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1450
(7th Cir. 1996) (limitations on commercial use of software enclosed in shrinkwrapped retail
packaging and displayed on screen upon use of software); and infra Part I.A. For examples
in the employment context, see Walker v. Ryan's Family Steak Houses, Inc., 400 F.3d 370,
374 (6th Cir. 2005) (arbitration agreement in "application packet" signed four or five days
after work began); EEOC v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps, 345 F.3d 742, 745 (9th
Cir. 2003) (arbitration agreement presented on first day of work); Ferrofluidics Corp. v.
Advanced Vacuum Components, Inc., 968 F.2d 1463, 1465 (1st Cir. 1992) (noncompete
presented on first day of work); and FLEXcon Co. v. McSherry, 123 F. Supp. 2d 42, 44 (D.
Mass. 2000) (noncompete signed three days into employment). Because less attention is
paid to the phenomenon of cubewrap terms, the timing of employees' receipt of
noncompete and arbitration clauses is not always noted in court opinions.
18.
Both also use waivers of rights to control and protect intellectual property,
although the analogy is looser. In the case of a consumer transaction, this is accomplished
by clauses explicitly prohibiting certain uses of the product in an effort to augment the
rights afforded to the seller under copyright law. In the employment context, noncompetes
are used in many instances to prevent the spread of the employer's trade secrets and
confidential information by prohibiting prospective employment in which workers will
likely rely on such knowledge.
19.
This analytical difference owes in part to doctrinal distinctions. Employment
agreements are service contracts governed by common law, while most consumer sales
involve goods, which are subject to the Uniform Commercial Code. My focus, however, is
not so much on the technical application of these bodies of law as on why there seems to be
significant attention paid to delayed terms as a policy matter in the latter context but not the
former.
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acceptance of the new terms. 20 In contrast, the validity of both noncompete and
employment arbitration agreements has turned largely on substantive assessments21
of their content, with limited attention to voluntariness in the arbitration context.
This Section compares these two treatments of the practice of delaying terms,
suggesting that the questions of contractual assent that have dominated judicial
assessment of consumer contracts ought to play a more critical role in the analysis
of cubewrap terms.
A. Enforcement of Delayed Term Consumer Transactions
What has recently developed in the field of employment law is nothing
new in the world of commercial transactions. Boilerplate forms are a standard
feature of consumer transactions, and commentators have long disagreed over their
enforceability. 22 Some have argued that form contracts should be subject to special
scrutiny to protect consumers from onerous terms, 23 while others believe that
businesses are well-positioned to efficiently allocate contractual risk in devising
standard forms.24 The law, however, has been clear and relatively static. Except in
specially regulated areas, these agreements are enforceable subject to ordinary
contract defenses, such as unconscionability. 25 To avoid enforcement of a
20.
Compare Hill, 105 F.3d at 1148 (finding arbitration provision shipped with
computer binding on customer), with Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1341
(D. Kan. 2000) (holding arbitration provision shipped with computer nonbinding). See infra
Part I.A.
21.

See infra Part I.B.

22.

The use of form contracts dates to eighteenth-century marine insurance

agreements. See Michael I. Meyerson, The Reunification of Contract Law: The Objective
Theory of Consumer Form Contracts, 47 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1263, 1263-64 (1993). Most

people's personal experience as consumers of both goods and services is enough to
convince them that form contracts are commonplace. See John J. A. Burke, Contracts as
Commodity: A Nonfiction Approach, 24 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 285, 290 (2000) ("Today, the
use of uniform and inflexible contract terms is the unquestioned and universal manner of
doing business."); W. David Slawson, StandardForm Contracts andDemocratic Controlof

Lawmaking Power, 84

HARV.

L. REv. 529, 529 (1971) (speculating that as much as ninety-

nine percent of modem paper contracts are standardized agreements).
23.
See, e.g., Meyerson, supra note 22, at 1269-70, 1278; Todd D. Rakoff,
Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REv. 1173, 1237-38
(1983); Slawson, supra note 22, at 544-47.
24.
See, e.g., Richard Craswell, Passing on the Costs of Legal Rules: Efficiency
andDistribution in Buyer-Seller Relationships, 43 STAN. L. REv. 361, 363-64 (1991); Alan
Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Imperfect Information in Markets for Contract Terms: The
Examples of Warranties and Security Interests, 69 VA. L. REv. 1387, 1392-93 (1983). See
generally Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and
Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REv. 1203, 1208-16 (2003) (describing theory that buyers
exert market discipline by comparing terms and/or integrating terms in their purchase
decisions resulting in socially efficient form contracts).
25.
An example of the exceptional case in which courts apply greater scrutiny to
form terms is the law of insurance contracts under which terms are construed in a manner
consistent with how a reasonable insured would understand them. See, e.g., Gerhardt v.
Cont'l Ins. Cos., 225 A.2d 328, 331-33 (N.J. 1966). See generally W. David Slawson,
Contractual DiscretionaryPower: A Law to Prevent Deceptive Contractingby Standard
Form, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REv. 853, 862-69 (discussing applicability of the doctrine of
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standardized contract or term, a consumer usually must show that the agreement
was reached under circumstances suggesting assent was compromised (procedural
unconscionability) and that the term in question is unduly favorable to one side
(substantive unconscionability).26 Few courts are willing to view adhesiveness
alone as an adequate demonstration of procedural unconscionability, 27 and even if
additional procedural defects are present, only egregious terms will be stricken.
The proliferation of delayed term contracts, however, has resulted in a
new body of jurisprudence. The classic delayed term transaction is the
"shrinkwrap" contract, in which a consumer purchases a product that contains
contractual terms within its packaging.28 Depending on their content, such terms
may significantly alter the value of the product to the consumer. In transactions
involving software or digital content, for instance, terms in the box may include
limits on use, such as restrictions on copying, resale, or third party use. These
terms will often enhance the default intellectual property rights of the seller while
defeating the expectations of the consumer.29 In addition, a variety of products
come with terms limiting consumer rights in the event of product defect, including
warranty exclusions, limitations on remedies, and the now ubiquitous arbitration
agreement.

reasonable expectations). A version of general applicability is included in the Second
Restatement of Contracts, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 (1981), but its
influence has been limited outside of a few jurisdictions. See, e.g., Lauvetz v. Alaska Sales
and Serv., 828 P.2d 162, 164-65 (Alaska 1991); Darner Motor Sales, Inc. v. Universal
Underwriters Ins. Co., 682 P.2d 388, 391-94 (Ariz. 1984). For proposals advocating the
broader use of RST 211 or a reasonable expectations standard in enforcing standard form
consumer contracts, see Wayne R. Barnes, Toward a FairerModel of Consumer Assent to
Standard Form Contracts, 82 WASH. L. REv. 227 (2007); Michael I. Meyerson, The
Efficient Consumer Form Contract: Law and Economics Meets the Real World, 24 GA. L.
REv. 583,600-11 (1990).
26.
See U.C.C. § 2-302 (2003) (official text); Williams v. Walker-Thomas
Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 450 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
27.
See infra note 58. A few courts, however, place less emphasis on the
procedural portion of the two-part test, suggesting that terms may be deemed unenforceable
due to substantive unconscionability alone. See, e.g., Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 676
N.Y.S.2d 569, 574 (1998). Others apply a sliding scale test, requiring less evidence of
procedural unconscionability in the face of especially oppressive terms. See, e.g.,
Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 690 (Cal. 2000).
28.
See infra notes 29-38 and accompanying text.
29.
See, e.g., ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1449-50 (7th Cir. 1996)
(prohibition on commercial use of data); U.S. Surgical Corp. v. Orris, Inc., 5 F. Supp. 2d
1201, 1205-06 (D. Kan.1998) (single use restriction). As Professor Braucher has noted, in
the case of transactions in information, such terms determine the product's value regardless
of whether it performs as expected. Braucher, supra note 6, at 756. A growing literature
attacks this particular type of delayed term not only on contract grounds but also as
preempted by and contrary to the balance of rights struck by public intellectual property
rules. See, e.g., Viva R. Moffat, Super-Copyright: Contracts,Preemption, and the Structure
of Copyright Policymaking, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. (forthcoming 2007); Elizabeth I.
Winston, Why Sell What You Can License? Contracting Around Statutory Protection of
IntellectualProperty, 14 GEO. MASON L. REv. 93 (2006).
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Courts are divided on the enforceability of such terms. Two cases from
the Seventh Circuit have led the trend in favor of enforcement. In ProCD,Inc. v.
Zeidenberg, the defendant purchased shrink-wrapped software at a retail
establishment, which included written terms prohibiting use of the product for
commercial purposes. 30 Although the defendant was not aware of these restrictions
until after he completed the purchase, the court held them binding. 3' In an opinion
by Judge Easterbrook, the court noted that the external packaging indicated that
additional terms were supplied in the box and that the buyer was permitted to
return the software if he or she found the enclosed terms disagreeable. 32 The court
by
therefore concluded that the defendant had accepted the terms in the box
33
keeping and using the software once he had the opportunity to review them.
The Seventh Circuit subsequently extended the holding of ProCD in
Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., which involved the enforceability of an arbitration
agreement enclosed with a personal computer. 34 In that case the plaintiffs ordered
and paid for the computer by phone and received notice of the arbitration
agreement only upon opening the shipping carton.35 In a second opinion by Judge
Easterbrook, the court found the agreement enforceable because, as in ProCD,the
36
purchaser could have returned the computer upon reviewing the delayed terms.
The court suggested that, from a practical perspective, enclosing terms in the
packaging was a reasonable method of presenting them.37 It found irrelevant the
upon ordering the computer that
fact that the consumer had been given no notice
38
additional terms would be supplied in the box.
Other courts have rejected this reasoning and its seeming manipulation of
contract formation rules. 39 A basic reading of the transaction in both cases suggests
that assent occurred at the time of purchase with the consumer agreeing to pay and
the manufacturer or retailer providing or agreeing to ship the product in question.
Viewed in this manner, the delayed terms come too late: the contract has already
formed and neither party can unilaterally amend its terms. 40 Certainly under
30.

86 F.3d at 1450.

31.
32.
33.

Id. at 1451.
Id.
Id. at 1453; see also Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1148 (7th

Cir. 1997); Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d 569, 572 (App. Div. 1998); M.A.
Mortenson Co. v. Timberline Software Corp., 998 P.2d 305, 313 (Wash. 2000).
34.
Hill, 105 F.3d at 1148.
35.
Id.
36.
Id.
37.
Id. at 1149
38.
Id.; see also ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1451; Lozano v. AT&T Wireless, 216 F.
Supp. 2d 1071, 1073 (C.D. Cal. 2002).

39.
See, e.g., Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91, 104-05 (3d
Cir. 1991); Klocek v. Gateway, 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1340-41 (D. Kan. 2000); U.S.
Surgical Corp. v. Orris, Inc., 5 F. Supp. 2d 1201, 1205-06 (D. Kan. 1998); Ariz. Retail Sys.,
Inc. v. Software Link, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 759, 765 (D. Ariz. 1993).
40.
See Klocek, 104 F. Supp. 2d at 1337-38 (describing the split of authority
over the enforceability of shrinkwrap terms as "tum[ing] on whether the court finds that the
parties formed their contract before or after the vendor communicated its terms to the
purchaser").
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common law, both assent and new consideration would be necessary at this point
to support what must be viewed as a formal modification. 4'
Most shrinkwrap contracts cases, however, are transactions in goods
arising under Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.),42 which allows

more flexibility in both the formation and modification of a contract. 43 Even so,
application of the code as currently adopted leads to the same result. Under prerevised section 2-207 dealing with the "battle of the forms" problem, a party may
unilaterally add a non-material term to the deal during the contract formation
process, but only where both parties to the transactions are merchants. 44 Where the
sale is between a merchant and a consumer, additional terms are treated as
proposals to amend the contract, meaning that they are enforceable only if the
recipient accepts them.4 5
Thus, the pivotal question in shrinkwrap contract cases is what constitutes
acceptance of new terms. Hill asserts that one can read a consumer's failure to
return a product after receipt of additional terms as an assent to their inclusion.4 6
However, other courts and several scholars have understood section 2-207 to
require a more explicit indication of assent. 47 Indeed, the purpose of section 2-207
41.

See, e.g., Angel v. Murray, 322 A.2d 630, 634-36 (R.I. 1974).

42.
See U.C.C. § 2-102 (2004) (revised text). It is an open question whether
software sales, like that at issue in ProCD, are transactions in goods. Many decisions, like
ProCD itself, proceed under that assumption, and scholars have sanctioned the approach.
See, e.g., Braucher, supra note 6, at 759. Amended Article 2, however, purports to exclude

"computer information" from the definition of goods. U.C.C. § 2-103(1), (in) (2004)
(revised text).
43.
Under the Code, no consideration is necessary to modify a contract, U.C.C. §
2-209(1) (2003) (official text), and a contract can form despite deviations in the parties'
proffered terms, U.C.C. § 2-207(1) (official text).
44.
U.C.C. § 2-207(2)(b) (official text). In both ProCD and Hill, Judge
Easterbrook was able to hold the terms in question enforceable in part by avoiding
application of Section 2-207. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1452 (7th Cir. 1996)
("Our case has only one form; UCC § 2-207 is irrelevant."); Hill, 105 F.3d at 1150. That
aspect of his decisions has been widely criticized, and scholars almost universally agree that
section 2-207 applies to delayed term consumer contracts. See, e.g., Braucher, supra note 7,
at 1821 ("Nothing in the language of section 2-207 supports the idea that its reach is limited
to exchanges of forms-it is not limited to two-form transactions or even to forms at all.");

Lawrence, supra note 7, at 1108 ("The court in both ProCD and Hill ignores any
relationship to section 2-207 with the cavalier conclusion that the section is irrelevant when
the transaction involves only one written form. This position is simply an inaccurate
statement of law."); James J. White, Default Rules in Sales and the Myth of Contracting
Out, 48 LoY. L. REv. 53, 81 (2002) ("When Judge Easterbrook in ProCDstates that Section
2-207 does not apply to transactions that involve only one document, he is wrong.").
45.
U.C.C. § 2-207(2) (official text).
46.
Hill, 105 F.3d at 1148-49 (citing ProCD,46 F.3d at 1451-52).
47.
See, e.g., Klocek v. Gateway, 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1341 (D. Kan. 2000)
("The Court finds that the act of keeping the computer past five days was not sufficient to
demonstrate that plaintiff expressly agreed to the Standard Terms."); Braucher, supra note
6, at 757-58; Lawrence, supra note 7, at 1108, 1114-16; White, supranote 7, at 736-37. As
previously noted, Judge Easterbrook did not analyze the consumers' assent to new terms
under section 2-207. See supra note 44.
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was to reverse the common law "last shot" doctrine, under which the terms of the
last form delivered would bind the other party upon performance. 4 Treating the
failure to return as acceptance under section 2-207 would allow for the same
outcome under that section as under the common law rule it was intended to
supercede. 49 In addition, the requirement of explicit acceptance of delayed terms is
consistent with other contract formation rules: under common law, an offeror
cannot designate ordinary acts, such as silence, as acceptance,5 ° and under section
2-207(2), which governs transactions between merchants, a material alteration of
an offer requires a subsequent acceptance. 5' Thus, while the issue is far from
settled, there appears to be ample support for the notion that a heightened
examination of assent is appropriate where a manufacturer purports to add terms to
a transaction that, on its face, has been executed.
B. The Formation of Cubewrap Contracts
In contrast to commercial law, assent has played only a limited role in
judicial analysis of the enforceability of cubewrap contracts. The jurisprudence of
noncompetes and that of arbitration agreements are discrete areas of law, which
focus not on how such terms are provided, but rather on what they say.5 2 In the
case of noncompete agreements, courts look at whether the restraint bears a
reasonable relationship to the protection of a legitimate interest of the employer,
taking into account the degree to which the restraint impairs the employee's ability

48.

See Dorton v. Collins & Aikman Corp., 453 F.2d 1161, 1165-66 (6th Cir.

1972).
49.
Cf Stephen K. Huber, Arbitration and Contracts: What are the Law Schools
Teaching?, 2 J. AM. ARB. 209, 227 (2003) (suggesting that Easterbrook's decision in Hill v.
Gateway "reintroduce[d] the last shot doctrine into contract law").
50.
See Brown Mach. Div. of John Brown v. Hercules, Inc., 770 S.W.2d 416,

421 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989) (acceptance cannot be assumed based on failure to object); Roger
C. Bern, "Terms Later" Contracting:Bad Economics, Bad Morals, and a Bad Idea for a
Uniform Law, Judge Easterbrook Notwithstanding, 12 J.L. & POL'Y 641, 680 (2004)
("[C]ontrary to Judge Easterbrook's suggestion, recognizing the offeror as 'master of the
offer' does not give him the power to turn the offeree's equivocal acts into acceptance.");
White, supra note 7, at 736-37 (arguing that a form cannot transform behavior that would
not normally indicate assent, such as tying one's shoelaces, into a contractual acceptance).
51.
U.C.C. § 2-207(2) (official text); see also Braucher, supra note 7, at 1823
("Section 2-207(2) recognizes that even merchants should not be expected to object to
material additions in order to avoid them. If businesses cannot be expected to inspect forms
sent after the making of a contract and object to material terms, a fortiori, consumers should
not have this burden."); White, supra note 7, at 750 ("[I]t is hard to swallow that the Ford
Motor Company gets the help of Section 2-207 in escaping the grasp of a seller's form, but
that the consumer buyer gets no such help.").
52.
The only published scholarly work of which I am aware that tackles
noncompete and employment arbitration agreements as a holistic problem is Cynthia L.
Estlund, Between Rights and Contract: Arbitration Agreements and Non-Compete
Covenants as a Hybrid Form of Employment Law, 155 U. PA. L. REv. 379 (2006), arguing
for treating the right to a jury trial and right to compete post employment as conditionally
waivable rights.
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to earn a living. 53 With respect to arbitration agreements, some courts initially
assessed contractual validity under a knowing and voluntary test similar to that
applied under the law of waivers and release agreements.5" However, since the
Supreme Court's decisions sanctioning arbitration of federal employment
discrimination claims,55 that trend appears to have come to an end.56 In most
jurisdictions, the enforceability of an arbitration agreement turns principally on the
quality and fairness of the arbitral process selected. If the process is too one-sided,
it might be viewed as a violation of the employee's underlying substantive rights,57
or the agreement might be deemed unconscionable as a matter of state law.58
A promise to refrain from competition is "unreasonably in restraint of trade
53.
if (a) the restraint is greater than is needed to protect the promisee's legitimate interest, or
(b) the promisee's need is outweighed by the hardship to the promisor and the likely injury
to the public." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 188(1)(a)-(b) (1981). While state
law varies, courts following the common law approach or applying state legislation to the
same effect typically require employers to establish both a legitimate property interest
deserving protection and that the restraint is reasonable in scope in consideration of the
harm to the employee and effect on the public. See, e.g., Freiburger v. J-U-B Eng'rs, Inc.,
111 P.3d 100, 105 (Idaho 2005); Merrimack Valley Wood Prods., Inc. v. Near, 876 A.2d
757, 762 (N.H. 2005); BDO Seidman v. Hirshberg, 712 N.E.2d 1220, 1223 (N.Y. 1999).
54.
See, e.g., Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299, 1305 (9th Cir.
1994).
55.
See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 113 (2001); Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 25-26 (1991).
56.
See, e.g., Penn v. Ryan's Family Steak Houses, Inc., 269 F.3d 753, 761 (7th
Cir. 2001) (questioning the continued validity of the Ninth Circuit's knowing and voluntary
standard); Caley v. Gulfstream Aerospace Corp., 428 F.3d 1359, 1372 (1 1th Cir. 2005)
(concluding "that general contract principles govern the enforceability of arbitration
agreements and that no heightened 'knowing and voluntary' standard applies"); Melena v.
Anheuser-Busch, 847 N.E.2d 99, 108 (Ill. 2006) (rejecting knowing and voluntary test as
inconsistent with the Federal Arbitration Act); Dennis Nolan, Employment Arbitration after
Circuit City, 41 BRANDEIs L.J. 853, 856-57 (2003) (Most courts outside the Ninth Circuit
"either doubt whether there is a requirement that waivers be knowing and voluntary or find
a purported waiver invalid only for egregious problems of assent." (footnote omitted)). But
see Walker v. Ryan's Family Steak Houses, Inc., 400 F.3d 370, 381 (6th Cir. 2005)
(sanctioning use of knowing and voluntary test).
57.
See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26 (suggesting that by agreeing to arbitrate, a party
must not "forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute") (quoting Mitsubishi Motors
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985)).
See, e.g., Circuit City Stores, Inc., 279 F.3d at 889, 892-93; Armendariz v.
58.
Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 694 (Cal. 2000) (finding unconscionable
an arbitration agreement that limited recovery of a successful employee to backpay while
preserving the employer's right to file claims against employees in court). Procedural
unconscionability is of course part of this analysis, however most courts are unwilling to
find procedural unconscionability based purely on the adhesiveness of contract terms. See,
e.g., In re Halliburton Co., 80 S.W.3d 566, 572 (Tex. 2002) ("[I]t cannot be unconscionable,
without more, merely to premise continued employment on acceptance of new or additional
employment terms."). Moreover, because the unconscionability test is conjunctive, even
courts willing to find procedural unconscionability in such circumstances would not void
the agreement absent substantive defects in the arbitration terms. See, e.g., Jones v. Genus
Credit Mgmt. Corp., 353 F. Supp. 2d 598, 601-02 (D. Md. 2005); Fittante v. Palm Springs
Motors, Inc., 129 Cal. Rptr. 2d 659, 670 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003).
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As to employment agreements provided after-the-fact, courts generally
treat the new terms as modifications and analyze them using basic common law
contract principles. In the context of noncompete agreements, there is almost
always a signed writing, 59 which courts uniformly accept as explicit manifestation
of assent, giving short shrift to defenses or policy arguments grounded in
coercion. 60 Hence, the analysis focuses on the presence or absence of
consideration, with courts divided over whether the employer's retention of the
61
employee constitutes consideration for the employee's additional promise. In the
arbitration context, the debate over continued employment as consideration plays
somewhat less of a role because many agreements are reciprocal in nature,
requiring both the employer and the employee to arbitrate any subsequent dispute.
In such situations, courts treat the employee's promise to arbitrate as supported by
the employer's promise to do the same.62

Few jurisdictions recognize oral noncompete agreements and some expressly
59.
require a signed writing. See, e.g., Geritrex Corp. v. DermaRite Indus., 910 F. Supp. 955,
960 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); ChemiMetals Processing, Inc. v. McEneny, 476 S.E.2d 374, 376
(N.C. Ct. App. 1996).
Courts have generally rejected claims brought by employees fired for
60.
refusing to sign a noncompete. See, e.g., Maw v. Advanced Clinical Commc'ns, Inc., 846
A.2d 604, 611 (N.J. 2004) (termination for refusal to sign overbroad noncompete did not
give rise to claim of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy); Tatge v. Chambers &
Owen, Inc., 579 N.W.2d 217, 221-25 (Wis. 1998). But see Conradi v. Eggers Consulting
Co., No. A-02-852, 2004 WL 51208 (Neb. Ct. App. Jan. 13, 2004) (recognizing promissory
estoppel claim for reliance on offer of employment).
Compare Lake Land Employment Group v. Columber, 804 N.E.2d 27, 3161.
32 (Ohio 2004), and Summits 7, Inc. v. Kelly, 886 A.2d 365, 372-73 (Vt. 2005), with OR.
REv. STAT. § 653.295 (1991) (permitting enforcement of noncompete agreed to after initial
employment only upon "bona fide advancement of the employee"), and Sanborn Mfg. Co.
v. Currie, 500 N.W.2d 161, 164 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993). See generally Tracy L. Staidl, The
Enforceability of NoncompetitionAgreements When Employment Is At- Will: Reformulating
the Analysis, 2 EMP. RTs. & EMP. POL'Y J. 95, 104-07 (1998) (summarizing and critiquing
various jurisdictional approaches to assessing the presence of employer consideration in
support of an employee's post-hire promise not to compete).
For this reason, a few courts have held arbitration agreements void for lack
62.
of consideration where the agreement either does not contain a reciprocal promise by the
employer to arbitrate, or allows the employer such flexibility with respect to altering or
utilizing the arbitration process as to suggest the absence of a meaningful promise. See, e.g.,
Gibson v. Neighborhood Health Clinics, Inc., 121 F.3d 1126, 1130-31 (7th Cir. 1997);
Cheek v. United Healthcare of Mid-Atlantic, Inc., 835 A.2d 656, 662 (Md. 2003) (refusing
to enforce arbitration clause in employment manual that reserved to employer permission to
alter agreement "at its sole and absolute discretion ... with or without notice"). Other courts
have recognized that there is no need for equivalency of obligation to arbitrate, provided
there is some consideration offered by the employer, such as the job itself. See, e.g., Oblix
Inc. v. Winiecki, 374 F.3d 488, 491 (7th Cir. 2004) ("That [the employer] did not promise
to arbitrate all of its potential claims is neither here nor there. [Plaintiff] does not deny that
the arbitration clause is supported by consideration-her salary."); Walters v. AAA
Waterproofing, Inc., 85 P.3d 389, 392 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004) (contract law does not require
equivalency of obligation with respect to specific terms, but merely that "the contract as a
whole is otherwise supported by consideration on both sides"). See generally Richard A.
Bales, Contract FormationIssues in Employment Arbitration,44 BRANDEIS L.J. 415, 450-
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Assent plays somewhat more of a role in courts' analyses of post-hire
arbitration agreements. Prudent employers generally disseminate their dispute
resolution policies in the form of an individual contract requiring a signature,
which will provide objective evidence of employee assent. 63 However, some
employers institute the requirement through handbooks, mailings, or even website
postings, arguing that the employees agree to the change by remaining on the job.
While several courts have recognized continued employment as acceptance in such
contexts, others have found a lack of assent on grounds that the employee did not
consciously accept the new term. 64 Similarly, some courts have paid attention to
how the arbitration contract was presented, whether its language was clear,
whether all arbitral rules were included or at least made available, and whether the
employee had adequate time to review the agreement. 65 These courts appear to be
applying some form of a knowing and voluntary review of employee assent.
However, their assessment is notably grounded more in issues of knowledge than
of voluntariness. 66 Relatively few courts find any problem with making an
arbitration agreement a required condition of continued employment. More
importantly, almost no court in either the noncompete or arbitration context has
considered the timing of the employer's provision of terms relative to its extension
of a job offer as part of this inquiry. 67 Agreements provided to employees for
58 (2006) (summarizing diverging caselaw approaches to requirement of employer
consideration to support employee agreement to arbitrate).
63.
The Federal Arbitration Act's declaration of the enforceability of arbitration
agreements applies only to written contracts. 9 U.S.C.A. § 2 (2000).
64.
Compare Melena v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 847 N.E.2d 99, 109 (Il. 2006)
("By continuing her employment with Anheuser-Busch [after employer mailed materials
regarding Dispute Resolution Program], plaintiff both accepted the offer and provided the
necessary consideration."), with Campbell v. Gen. Dynamics Gov't Sys. Corp., 407 F.3d
546, 556-58 (1st Cir. 2005) (holding arbitration agreement unenforceable where policy
distributed via hyperlink in e-mail notification and employee did not reply to message). See
generally Bales, supra note 62, at 436-42 (summarizing cases addressing whether employee
had sufficient notice of arbitration policy to permit finding of assent).
See, e.g., Walker v. Ryan's Family Steak Houses, Inc., 400 F.3d 370, 384
65.
(6th Cir. 2006) (arbitration agreements unenforceable where managers hurriedly presented
them and inaccurately characterized their significance); Shaffer v. ACS Gov't Servs., Inc.,
321 F. Supp. 2d 682, 687 (D. Md. 2004) (arbitration clause contained on page 56 of a 71page employee guidebook not enforceable); Prevot v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 133 F. Supp.
2d 937, 940-41 (S.D. Tex. 2001) (arbitration agreement provided only in English not
enforceable against Spanish-speaking employees); Gaylord Dep't Stores of Ala., Inc. v.
Stephens, 404 So. 2d 586, 588 (Ala. 1981) (holding a clause "buried in paragraph thirtyfour in a contract containing forty-six paragraphs" not enforceable). See generally Bales,

supra note 62, at 442-46 (discussing cases).
See Eileen Silverstein, From Statute to Contract: The Law of The
66.
Employment Relationship Reconsidered, 18 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 479, 504-11 (200001) ("[I]t appears that the law will find a prospective waiver voluntary if individual
employees or applicants had constructive notice of the waiver. This applies even if they did
not have the incentive or background knowledge to understand the real world consequences
of the waiver and regardless of whether they were unable to negotiate adjustments to
employers' take-it-or-leave-it offers.").
67.
It seems the closest courts have come to such an analysis is New
Hampshire's treatment of post-hire noncompetes, under which the "bad faith" of an
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"acceptance" upon the commencement of employment are treated no differently
than other changes in policy administered during the course of an ongoing
employment relationship.
What is missing from the analysis in both the noncompete and arbitration
contexts is attention to the contracting practices of the employer. Giving courts the
benefit of the doubt, there are certainly reasons why the law should allow
employers flexibility in modifying employment relationships after they have
begun. An employee's position may develop in such a way that he or she gains
exposure to trade secrets, justifying the imposition of a noncompete agreement that
was not needed at the onset of the relationship. An employer may make a costbenefit analysis that justifies adopting an arbitration policy that did not exist
before. Such concerns, however, are not implicated where an employer has an
established policy requiring consent to a noncompete or arbitration agreement as
an initial condition of employment. Not only is the flexibility justification absent,
but the employer's decision to withhold the requisite forms until the employee has
entered the relationship also suggests possible concealment or sharp practices. 68 In
such situations, the question of assent and the likelihood of coercion bear closer
examination, and decisions favoring enforcement based on formalistic applications
of contract principles require new justification.

I1. CUBEWRAP CONTRACTS AS CONSUMER TRANSACTION FINE
PRINT: LESSONS FROM THE DELAYED TERM DEBATE
The previous Section described the functional similarities between
delayed term consumer contracts and cubewrap contracts, as well as the limited
attention paid to employers' practice of delivering noncompete and arbitration
clauses post-acceptance. Given that these two categories of contract involve very
different stakes and purposes, it is tempting to conclude that delayed term and
cubewrap contracts have little to say to one another. Yet that would be a mistake.
Examining employment contracts through the lens of consumer law calls attention
to the particular practice of delaying terms as distinct from other aspects of the
employment relationship that affect the quality of assent, such as general concerns
about employee bargaining power. Consumer law also offers an existing
framework for considering the merits of this practice. In that context, there has
been vocal resistance by scholars to the enforcement of delayed terms based not
only on doctrinal interpretation 69 but also on fairness grounds. 70 To the extent that
employer in not providing advance notice can be a basis for refusing to modify an
overbroad agreement. See Merrimack Valley Wood Prods., Inc. v. Near, 876 A.2d 757, 764
(N.H. 2005); infra Part III.A.2; cf. Kuhn v. Ameriquest Mortgage Co., No. 04-2229, 2004
WL 2782568, at *5-6 (D. Kan. Dec. 1, 2004) (enforcing arbitration agreement signed on the
first day of work, noting that the employee received advance warning that it would be
provided).
68.
Cf. Braucher, supra note 7, at 1852-65 (suggesting that sellers' practice of
withholding terms in the consumer context should be treated as a violation of unfair and
deceptive trade practices laws).
69.
Such arguments generally focus on courts' seeming misapplication of UCC
section 2-207 in analyzing delayed terms. See, e.g., Braucher, supra note 7, at 1821-24;
Lawrence, supra note 7, at 1107-11, 1120-21; White, supra note 7, at 741-49.
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thinkers find it objectionable to hamstring vulnerable consumers to undisclosed
terms in purchasing a product, it appears even more problematic to allow precisely
the same practice in a context where an individual's livelihood is at stake.
This Section draws out the lessons from the delayed term debate,
assessing the applicability of the primary arguments in favor of shrinkwrap terms
to the employment context, as well as the counterarguments that have been
asserted against them. In the consumer context, the primary justifications for
enforcing delayed term contracts appear to fall into two categories-formalist and
realist. 7' By formalist, I mean to embrace all arguments that justify delayed terms
through some manipulation of contract formation principles. By realist, I refer to
arguments grounded in the exigencies of the transaction, such as concerns about
the viability of other available means of delivering standardized terms. Whatever
their worth in the consumer context, an issue that is subject to much debate, these
justifications hold no currency where an employment relationship is at stake.
A. The Modification Fallacy: Returning the Job?
The first set of arguments in support of delayed terms justifies
enforcement through a formalistic understanding of consumer assent. They either
move the point of contractual liability forward in time to the moment delayed
terms are received and the product retained or characterize the arrival of delayed
terms and retention of the product as a modification to the initial agreement. The
premise underlying both conceptions is that the consumer retains the ability to
cancel the purchase by rejecting the delayed terms. Once the consumer receives
the product and chooses to keep it, he or she accepts the final deal.72
The rationale underlying these formulations has been questioned in the
consumer context given the practical and psychological barriers to rejecting a
product one has already purchased.73 Effort is required to repackage and ship a
70.
See, e.g., Bern, supra note 50, at 696 (characterizing delayed terms as "a
deceptive strategy under the guise of efficiency to bind customers to adverse terms
concealed from them until after they have made the purchase decision and parted with their
money"); White, supra note 7, at 747-48 (describing the coercive nature of post-receipt
requests for consent).
71.
I use these terms in a functional manner, not as reflecting any particular
jurisprudential philosophy. On their significance in that context, see Franklin G. Snyder,
Clouds of Mystery: Dispelling the Realist Rhetoric of the Uniform Commercial Code, 68
OHIO ST. L.J. 11 (2007).
72.
See Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1150 (7th Cir. 1997) ("By
keeping the computer beyond 30 days, the Hills accepted Gateway's offer, including the
arbitration clause."); ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1453 (7th Cir. 1996)
("Zeidenberg inspected the package, tried out the software, learned of the license, and did
not reject the goods."); Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d 569, 571 (App. Div.
1998) ("Th[e] contract ... was formed and acceptance was manifested not when the order
was placed but only with the retention of the merchandise beyond the 30 days specified in
the Agreement enclosed in the shipment of merchandise."); M.A. Mortenson Co. v.
Timberline Software Corp., 998 P.2d 305, 313 (Wash. 2000) ("Mortenson's use of the
software constituted its assent to the agreement, including the license terms.").
73.
See, e.g., Bern, supra note 50, at 725; Braucher, supra note 6, at 768; White,
supra note 7, at 748; Deborah Zalesne, Enforcing the Contract at All (Social) Costs: The
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good already received. Judge Easterbrook implicitly acknowledges this in deciding
against the consumer in Hill v. Gateway, noting that the Hills might have been
more successful in arguing that they were deterred from returning their computer
by the cost of shipping. 74 Added to this monetary expense is the physical
inconvenience of restoring an assembled computer with all of its parts and packing
material to its original carton and lugging it to the post office. 75 Finally, the
consumer may be psychologically unwilling to reject a product in which he or she
has already invested. Research on human psychology suggests that individuals are
overconfident in assessing their own prospects for success and underestimate the
likelihood that something may go wrong, particularly remote events.76 Thus, in the
consumer context, individuals may discount terms such as limitations on damages
or warranties, believing it unlikely that they will be injured by a product.77 Such
biases are even more probable when the consumer has reached what he or she
considers a good decision.78 Once the individual has selected, received, and set up
the product, cognitive dissonance may prevent him or her from recognizing that
the deal is not as favorable as expected.
Such obstacles are all the more burdensome in the employment context,
where the employee has already invested financially and emotionally in what he or
she expects to be a reliable means of earning a living. Like the consumer, an
employee can elect to "return" the job upon receipt of the delayed terms; in other
words, he or she is free to quit. Indeed this right to reject persists well beyond the
thirty days that Gateway allows customers to assess its product.79 Yet the practical
impediments to doing so are legion. The employee has likely incurred significant
start-up costs in accepting the job and starting work. He or she has already quit a
prior position and may have turned down other offers. Many employees have made
Boundary between Private Contract Law and the Public Interest, 11 TEX. WESLEYAN
REv. 579, 589 (2005).
74.
Hill, 105 F.3d at 1150.

L.

75.
See Bern, supra note 50, at 725; Braucher, supra note 6, at 768. Professor
White describes the consumer's perspective most vividly by imagining him "sitting in his
study in International Falls, Minnesota, in his underwear with a beer when he has to decide
whether to agree to the new terms or go out in the negative-thirty-degree temperature and
return the computer." White, supra note 7, at 748.
76.
See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of
Contract,47 STAN. L. REV. 211, 217, 223 (1995); Korobkin, supra note 24, at 1232-33.

77.

See Korobkin, supra note 24, at 1222-34; Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J.

Rachlinski, Standard-FormContractingin the Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. REv. 429, 45054 (2002).

78.
See Braucher, supra note 6, at 765-66 (suggesting that delaying terms will
have a depressive effect on reading due to cognitive dissonance).
79.
It is precisely because employment is at will that courts generally find
cubewrap noncompetes to be valid contract modifications supported by consideration in the
form of continued employment. See, e.g., Lake Land Employment Group of Akron, LLC v.
Columber, 804 N.E.2d 27, 31-32 (Ohio 2004); Summits 7, Inc. v. Kelly, 886 A.2d 365,
372-73 (Vt. 2005). See generally Jordan Leibman & Richard Nathan, The Enforceability of
Post-Employment Noncompetition Agreements Formed After At-Will Employment Has
Commenced: The "Afterthought" Agreement, 60 S. CAL. L. REv. 1465, 1523-28 (1987)

(summarizing theory of forbearance as consideration); Staidl, supra note 61, at 104-07
(summarizing cases).
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personal sacrifices and investments at this point, such as relocating family and
accepting other lifestyle changes, all of which will deter departure. 80 Quitting
means swallowing those losses, giving up a steady pay check, and re-entering an
uncertain job market.
Even the employee with a marketable skill set and the financial flexibility
necessary to extricate may be unable or unwilling to actually do so postacceptance. Terms like arbitration clauses and promises not to compete require
employees to value choices that will become relevant only upon the demise of the
relationship, an event they are unlikely to anticipate when commencing a new
job.81 Indeed, the period immediately following hire is likely to be the one in
which employees are most optimistic about their future employment. Beliefs about
the quality and duration of employment may even be explicitly reinforced by
management personnel who reassure the workers about
their prospects and treat
82
the required written documents as "routine paperwork.,
Of course, many employees are in no position to scrutinize terms
regardless of when they are presented. Employers are usually better able to replace
a worker than an individual is able to find new work, and the cognitive limitations
previously discussed can impact decision-making at any point in the hiring
process. Such defects in bargaining, particularly those that result from the basic
state of the world, are generally not a basis in and of themselves for refusing to
enforce an otherwise valid agreement. 83 Contract law routinely binds employees to
80.
See, e.g., Summits 7 Inc., 886 A.2d at 377 (Johnson, J., dissenting) (noting
that "employees often have obligations and responsibilities that require them to stay with
their job, even if it means signing onto an agreement that restricts their right to seek other
jobs in the future"); Conradi v. Eggers Consulting Co., No. A-02-852, 2004 WL 51208, at
*2 (Neb. Ct. App. Jan. 13, 2004) (employee had resigned from job, turned down promotion,
signed a lease, bought a car, and moved from Seattle to Omaha by. the time employer
provided noncompete three weeks into employment).
81.
See Bodie, supra note 10, at 38 ("As with marriage and unemployment,
people do not appear to enter a job with the expectation that their employment law rights
will be violated."); Schwartz, supra note 8, at 114 ("The prospective employee's present
need for a job is immediate and real, whereas the possibility of future discrimination ... is

remote and hypothetical."). For further discussions of how cognitive limitations could affect
an employee's decision to accept a noncompete or an arbitration agreement, see Bodie,
supra note 10, at 31-39; Christine M. Reilly, Achieving Knowing and Voluntary Consent in
Pre-DisputeMandatory Arbitration Agreements at the Contracting Stage of Employment,
90 CAL. L. REv. 1203, 1228-34 (2002); Rena Mara Samole, Note, Real Employees:
Cognitive Psychology and the Adjudication of Non-Competition Agreements, 4 WASH. U.
J.L. & POL'Y 289, 307-11 (2000).
82.
FLEXcon Co. v. McSherry, 123 F. Supp. 2d 42, 44 (D. Mass. 2000); see also
Walker v. Ryan's Family Steak Houses, Inc., 400 F.3d 370, 373-74 (6th Cir. 2005)
(managers hurriedly presented arbitration agreements as part of necessary application
packet). See generally Bodie, supra note 10, at 34 (describing common scenario of HR
administrator presenting arbitration agreements along with other forms as a prerequisite to
formal employment); Nolan, supranote 56, at 859 ("New employees for any employer must
sign a multitude of forms. . . .[R]arely do employees have sufficient time to read and
evaluate everything they sign.").
83.
See Melena v. Anheuser-Busch, 847 N.E.2d 99, 109 (Ill. 2006) (rejecting
plaintiff's argument that employer's dispute resolution policy was unenforceable as illusory
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all sorts of adhesive terms. The point, rather, is that delaying terms is a choice the
employer makes-a strategy that exacerbates those cognitive and practical
constraints, making it even harder for workers to objectively assess and reject
unfavorable terms. Indeed, the timing of cubewrap contracts appears expressly
designed to capitalize on preexisting imbalances, delaying what might otherwise
be deal-breaking terms until it is impossible for even a resilient worker to carefully
evaluate them and ultimately refuse. Not only has that individual made a major
investment, it is one that most likely cannot be recouped. Most workers will be
unable to return to their prior jobs or resurrect forgone opportunities, and because
the new position has just begun, the employee has gained no value of any
assistance in "shopping around" for alternatives. If anything, he or she has gained
a reputation as a troublemaker: an employee who has the audacity to read-and
object to-an employer's standard forms.
B. PracticalExigencies? The IndividualHiring Decision

Realist arguments in support of enforcing delayed term consumer
contracts center on the supposed difficulty or pointlessness of providing detailed
terms in advance of purchase. In Hill v. Gateway, Judge Easterbrook contemplates
a parade of horribles should delayed terms be found unenforceable: simple
transactions will be dragged out into lengthy endeavors as sellers spell out each
and every term of the deal before a purchase can be made. 84 Modem technology,
however, would appear to belie any concern about the impracticality of providing
detailed terms in advance. 85 Manufacturers can make all standard terms available
on their websites and refer consumers to that resource, 86 and in the case of an online transaction, there is ample time for a consumer to review any fine print prior
to submitting his or her order. 87 Nevertheless, there remains genuine debate over
whether there is any point to such disclosures. If consumers do not read fine print
terms in any event, providing them in the box would seem an appropriate choice,
saving both the company and the consumer time and money.
Neither the practical exigencies of the circumstances nor the presence of
non-readers would appear to justify cubewrap terms. The process of hiring a
and adhesive simply because "[the employer] gave her little choice in the matter");
Schwartz, supra note 8, at 107 ("A categoricalassertion of unequal bargaining power, such
as exists generically in . . . employment-related contracts, will not, by itself, provide

grounds to invalidate agreements to arbitrate."). See generally Rakoff, supra note 23, at
1185 (describing general rules that enforce form contracts regardless of their adhesive
effects).
84.
Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1149 (7th Cir. 1997).
85.
See Braucher, supra note 6, at 768 ("Advance disclosure in the age of
computers and the Internet is simple and cheaper than printing copies and getting them into
boxes. Sellers have the terms in an electronic file, and all they have to do is put that content
on their Internet sites and tell buyers where to look." (citation omitted)).
86.
Gateway now posts its complete set of standardized terms on its website. In
addition, I have had at least one first-year contracts student tell me that in the course of
purchasing a Gateway computer by telephone, she was informed by the sales representative
that the computer would be shipped with additional terms in the box.
87.
See Robert A. Hillman, Online Boilerplate: Would Mandatory Website
Disclosureof E-StandardTerms Backfire?, 104 MICH. L. REv. 837, 839-40 (2006).
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worker, no matter how regimented it has become in some contexts, is still a far cry
from a mass market transaction. Manufacturers need forms and efficient means of
delivering them because consumer transactions happen quickly and often the seller
does not deal with end users. Customers have come to expect that they can order a
product by simply swiping a credit card or clicking on a webpage without any
negotiation whatsoever. On the other hand, the decision to begin an employment
relationship is still a relatively personal one. Employers in many situations conduct
face-to-face interviews or at least consider candidates individually. Employers may
prefer to have all of their employees bound by the same set of standard terms, but
terms cannot be made available to the applicant prior
there is no reason why those
88
to his or her acceptance.
For the same reason, one suspects that employees are more likely than
consumers to actually read the documents that are provided to them. The decision
to accept a particular job generally involves deliberation, which may occur over a
span of time. Employees thus have the opportunity to read and consider any
written terms provided up front. Perhaps more importantly, workers have much
greater incentive to read and comprehend employment forms than they do the fine
print that accompanies consumer goods. Unlike an isolated purchase, accepting a
job means committing to a relationship, one that is the source of one's livelihood
and a critical part of one's identity. That is not to say that employees will always
act rationally and judiciously in evaluating boilerplate terms. 89 It would be wrong,
however, to assume that employees, even those who are non-readers in the
consumer context, will dismiss written employment terms as they would the fine
print that accompanies the purchase of a toaster. If employees do not read
cubewrap terms, it is more likely a result of the delay in providing them than a
justification for the practice.
Perhaps what truly underlies pragmatic defenses of delayed term
contracting is not the notion that consumers do not read, but rather that they cannot
refuse. If that is the root of the realist position, it is hardly a justification for
delayed terms so much as a call for even greater intervention.9" In the next Part, I
explore further the role of external checks on the substantive content of cubewrap
terms. At this juncture, however, it is sufficient to note that arguments favoring
enforcement based on the improbability of reading are ultimately no different than
unabashed sanctioning of the drafter's right to insist on whatever terms it chooses.
If bargaining power is the issue, then the individual's proclivity for reading is
irrelevant. And while many, if not most, are unable to negotiate terms, or, in the
case of employees, unable even to refuse the deal, that does not justify the
disenfranchisement of the few who can.

88.
At a minimum, employers can tell applicants that an arbitration or
noncompete agreement will be required. See, e.g., Kuhn v. Ameriquest Mortgage Co., No.
04-2229, 2004 WL 2782568, at *5 (D. Kan. Dec. 1, 2004).
89.
As previously discussed, cognitive limitations such as overconfidence and
the discounting of remote events can affect employees' assessment of non-salient terms. See
supra note 76 and accompanying text.
90.
See Braucher, supra note 6, at 764.
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III. SAVING

PRIVATE ORDERING: IS THERE A PLACE FOR
STANDARDIZED FORMS IN THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP?

The previous Section suggested that the justifications for enforcing
delayed term consumer contracts are not applicable in the employment context and
that the risks of standard form contracts justify special scrutiny. Yet, just as with
consumer transactions, there are legitimate reasons for the use of standard forms in
employment relationships. 91 Forms are convenient and predictable. They ensure
consistency in personnel management across large organizations, which can
enhance workforce morale and productivity. They reduce the risk that the
employer will be bound by situation-specific assurances made by individual
employees and provide a mechanism for clarifying which obligations the company
perceives as legally binding.92
Thus, the question is how to legitimize this form of private ordering in the
employment relationship. This Section offers a starting point for doing so, drawing
on the principal response to delayed term consumer transactions-mandatory
disclosure. It proposes a bright line rule that would prohibit enforcement of any
terms withheld until after the employee's acceptance of the initial offer of
employment. While required disclosure is not a solution to the problem of
employer overreaching, it can make a difference to at least some employees while
leaving open the possibility of improvements on existing substantive initiatives
that protect those with less bargaining power.
A. Building on Procedural Initiatives: Mandatory Disclosure of Cubewrap
Terms
One response to the problem of shrinkwrap consumer contracts has been
a call for disclosure. Commentators have argued that manufacturers should be
required to provide all terms in advance of purchase or at a minimum to notify
consumers that additional terms will be provided with the product and their assent
required as part of the transaction. 93 Under such proposals, delayed terms would be
unenforceable and might constitute a violation of consumer protection laws.94 A
comparable approach could be adopted in the employment context. Either through
common law or statutory initiative, any term withheld until after the employee's
acceptance of the initial offer would be
unenforceable if the term could have been
95
provided as part of the hiring process.
91.
Despite widespread concern about the enforcement of standard form
consumer agreements and the consensus that consumers do not read or understand their
terms, most commentators agree that they are an essential part of business. See, e.g., Randy
E. Barnett, Consenting to Form Contracts, 71

FORDHAM

L. REv. 627, 630 (2002) ("[Florm

contracts make the world go round.").
92.
Cf Rakoff, supra note 23, at 1223 (noting that standard form contracts serve
as an "automatic check on ... wayward sales personnel [who might] make bargains into
which the organization is unwilling to enter").
93.
E.g., Braucher, supranote 6, at 769; White, supra note 7, at 746-48.
94.
See Braucher, supra note 7, at 1807-08.
95.
Courts will in some cases have to wrestle with whether the facts support a
prior acceptance by the employee. For instance, an applicant may informally accept a job
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1. ArbitrationAgreements and Employee Volition
In the arbitration context, federal legislation might ultimately be
necessary to achieve a uniform disclosure rule immune from preemption
challenges. 96 However, such a move would be consistent with existing common
law focusing on procedural aspects of contract formation. Notwithstanding the
judicial trend in favor of arbitration, a species of the knowing and voluntary test
for enforceability survives in a few jurisdictions, and courts remain willing to
condemn employer behavior that is sufficiently misleading to undermine assent.
For instance, in Walker v. Ryan's Family Steak Houses, Inc., the plaintiffs
were former employees in a variety of low-level restaurant positions who signed
an arbitration agreement contained in a twelve-page packet of application
materials. 97 Most received the materials during the course of fifteen- to twentyminute job interviews, while a few were hired on the spot, then asked to complete
the application materials during their first few days on the job.98 The court refused
enforcement, citing the absence of both mutual assent to the contract and a
knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to a jury trial. The court noted that the
employer presented the applicants with various documents, instructed them to sign,
and afforded the plaintiffs no opportunity to take the materials home for careful
review. 99 It also emphasized that the employer gave the applicants incorrect and
misleading information about the meaning of the arbitration agreement, telling
them that it merely required internal processing of any workplace dispute as a first
step to resolution.100 Thus, while the court did not pay special attention to the fact
that some "applicants" signed the agreement after having accepted and started
work, it based its decision in large part on the employer's method of presenting
and characterizing the agreement.
offer with the expectation that additional terms remain to be discussed, after which the
employer promptly forwards its standard forms to the applicant, who signs prior to
commencing the job. In that situation, it may be appropriate for the court to find adequate
disclosure by the employer and enforce the standard terms subject to existing substantive
limitations. The result must turn on the timing of disclosure relative to the reasonable
actions of the employee in anticipation of the new job. Consistent with the idea that delayed
terms can only be enforceable if the individual has the ability to reject the deal, disclosure
that comes after an employee has quit, turned down other offers, or made other significant
and irreversible investments should be deemed too late.
96.
Section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act, permitting courts to revoke
arbitration agreements on the same grounds that would permit revocation of any contract, 9
U.S.C. § 2 (2006), has been interpreted to preempt any state law disfavoring arbitration
agreements. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 (1984). Thus, many have noted
that absent reinterpretation of the FAA by the Supreme Court, efforts to more aggressively
scrutinize the enforceability of employee arbitration agreements, whether by inquiry into
substance or process, will require legislative action. See, e.g., Nolan supra note 56, at 881
("Congress could at any time amend the FAA or the anti-discrimination laws to limit or
prohibit pre-dispute arbitration agreements covering statutory issues. A single sentence
would do the job.").
97.
400 F.3d 370, 373 (6th Cir. 2005).
98.
Id. at 373-74.
99.
1d.at 381-82.
100.
Id. at 382.
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A mandatory disclosure rule complements this analysis. It recognizes that
a choice to delay information is a form of misleading behavior, which is just as
condemnable, if not more so, as providing inaccurate information. Cubewrap
agreements mislead employees, not about the content of their terms, but about the
job the employees are accepting. Absent receipt of terms in advance, the
technicalities of what they require hardly matter, as it is too late for most
employees to quibble about what they say, let alone reject them. In this way,
disclosure also makes real the notion of fair process that decisions like Walker
appear to endorse. A delay in providing terms fundamentally impairs the
employee's ability to choose whether to accept the job irrespective of how much
time he or she has to read and consider them.'0 '
In this way, a rule that makes delay a determinative factor in assessing
enforceability is consistent with the large body of scholarship supporting the
application of a knowing and voluntary standard to pre-dispute arbitration
agreements. Some thinkers have proposed tests that, like Walker, emphasize
employee knowledge and consider such factors as the opportunity to read, seek
counsel, and revoke consent.' 0 2 Others, however, have focused more closely on
voluntariness in recognition of the fact that the employee's ability to reject
unilaterally drafted terms comes at the cost of employment.' 0 3 The difficulty with
such proposals is that tying voluntariness to an employee's financial independence
would render unenforceable any term that is made a condition of employment. A
disclosure rule acknowledges legitimate concerns about employee vulnerability,
yet remains consistent with the Supreme Court's announced policy in favor of
arbitration and general contract principles that do not treat limited bargaining
power alone as a basis for voiding contracts. At least in this discrete set of
circumstances where the employee's lack of choice is heightened as a direct result
of the employer's conduct, the level of voluntariness requisite for assent should be
deemed absent.
2. Agreements Not to Compete and Employer Bad Faith
In contrast to the arbitration context, the law of noncompete agreements
offers relatively few examples of courts policing employee assent. At least one
jurisdiction, however, has suggested that the practice of delaying terms could be

See Schwartz, supra note 8, at 131 ("The drafting party could pay to send the
101.
adherent to an all-day seminar on the implications of its arbitration clause. But unless the
adherent has a meaningful opportunity to bargain or shop that term, she may feel compelled
to accept it no matter what."); Silverstein, supra note 66, at 504-10 (critiquing courts that
focus on employee notice at the expense of more thorough treatment of voluntariness).
102.
See, e.g., Robert Belton, The Unfinished Agenda of the Civil Rights Act of
1991, 45 RUTGERS L. REV. 921, 961-62 (1993); Karen Halverson, Arbitration and the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, 67 U. CtN. L. REv. 445, 481-83 (1999).
103.
See, e.g., Sarah Rudolph Cole, Incentives and Arbitration: The Case Against
Enforcement of Executory Arbitration Agreements Between Employers and Employees, 64
UMKC L. REV. 449, 458-59 (1996); Silverstein, supra note 66, at 504-10; Jeffrey Stempel,
A Better Approach to Arbitrability, 65 TUL. L. REv. 1377, 1438-42 (1990-91) (proposing
"inescapable adhesion" as a defense to an arbitration agreement in context of a "necessity"
such as employment).
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evidence of bad faith, limiting the employer's ability to enforce an overbroad
agreement. In Merrimack Valley Wood Products, Inc. v. Near, the employee
worked for the company for six months before being asked to sign a "salesman
agreement" containing a noncompete.1 ° 4 The employer stated that continued
employment was10contingent
on signing, and the employee gave the agreement only
5
a cursory review.
In the employer's subsequent suit against the employee following his
departure from the company, the New Hampshire Supreme Court refused to
enforce the noncompete. It did not assess the employee's assent to the post-hire
terms and seemingly took as a given that a valid contract had been formed.
However, it found the scope of the restraint unreasonable and refused to modify
the contract, based in part on the employer's choice to delay terms.'0 6 The court
noted that judges have the power to reform an overly broad noncompete only
where the employer acts in good faith. Such good faith refers not only to the scope
of the restraint but also the circumstances surrounding the execution of the
agreement. In this case, the employer withheld the noncompete during the hiring
process, failing to inform the employee during his interviews with multiple
company representatives that such an agreement would be required. 10 7 The court,
therefore, held that the employer had shown bad faith, precluding judicial
modification and enforcement of the delayed agreement.108
From this analysis, it is a short step to holding unenforceable any
agreement provided after initial acceptance if the employer could have included it
for employee consideration during the hiring process. The difference would be that
under the disclosure approach advanced here, a cubewrap noncompete would be
unenforceable regardless of its reasonableness. The fact that terms are not overly
burdensome to the employee does not make an agreement volitional. If the
employer's contracting practices obliterate any real option for the employee to
terminate and reject the new terms, courts should treat that conduct as vitiating
employee assent.
B. The Limits of Disclosure
Of course, required disclosure is by no means a full solution to the
problem of adhesive employment contracts, and in the consumer context, there has
104.

876 A.2d 757, 760 (N.H. 2005).

105.
106.

Id.
Id. at 763-65.

107.

Id. at 764-65.

108.
Id.; see also Ferrofluidics Corp. v. Advanced Vacuum Components, 968 F.2d
1463, 1470-71 (1st Cir. 1992) (confirming that "the timing of the initial presentation of the
restrictive covenant to the employee may bear on the employer's good faith"); Smith,
Batchelder & Rugg v. Foster, 406 A.2d 1310, 1313-14 (N.H. 1979) (holding bad faith

precluded judicial reformation where employees executed noncompetes after hire and
following agreement to oral terms of employment). Other courts, while not basing their
holdings on such grounds, have noted the employer's delay in requesting a noncompete in
finding such an agreement unenforceable. See, e.g., FLEXcon Co. v. McSherry, 123 F.
Supp. 2d 42, 44 (D. Mass. 2000); Corroon & Black of Nashville, Inc. v. Lee, 1984 Tenn.

App. LEXIS 2695, at *4-5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 16, 1984).
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been significant debate about its utility. The principal objection is that consumers
do not read standardized forms, nor does it make sense for them to read given the
near impossibility of renegotiating them.' 0 9 If that is the case, disclosure makes
little difference, and substantive regulation of delayed terms is needed." 0
While such concerns are legitimate, there is reason to think disclosure
will protect some employees, and perhaps more employees than consumers. As
previously discussed, employees are likely to be readers. Unlike the spot purchase
of a consumer good, choosing a job is a high stakes proposition that occasions a
longer and more deliberative decision-making process."' There is both adequate
time and incentive to read the written terms, which are often less dense than the
usual consumer fine print. The limits of disclosure therefore do not stem from an
unwillingness to read so much as an inability to bargain.
Not all employees, however, lack the ability to bargain. While individuals
are less powerful than both manufacturers and employers, at least some are in a
position to insist on a change of terms. Importantly, the usual process of entering
into an employment contract allows for this. Relatively few terms of employment
are standardized and even unsophisticated workers will negotiate over at least
some terms, if nothing other than the day they are to start work. In contrast, almost
all terms of consumer transactions are pro forma, and the customer generally has
no access to an agent with the knowledge to explain or authority to deviate from
them."12 Indeed, in the case of a purchase made through a supplier, the customer is
not even dealing with the manufacturer who drafted the terms.
In the employment context, some hiring managers may similarly lack
authority to alter or omit standard forms dictated by human resource or in-house
legal departments. However, in that situation, there is at least the option to raise
questions up the organizational chain of command. In the noncompete context, for
instance, anecdotal evidence suggests that higher level workers do in fact dicker
over the scope of noncompete agreements or at least carefully consider and
question their terms.1 3 In addition, even failed efforts to renegotiate can ultimately
109.
See Eisenberg, supra note 76, at 243 ("Faced with preprinted terms whose
effect the form taker knows he will find difficult or impossible to fully understand, which
involve risks that probably will never mature, which are unlikely to be worth the cost of
search and processing, and which probably aren't subject to revision in any event, a rational
form taker will typically decide to remain ignorant of the preprinted terms."); Meyerson,
supra note 25, at 600 ("[T]he benefit to be derived from acquiring adequate knowledge of
contract terms is usually low and is likely to be far exceeded by the significant costs of
acquiring that information. It is, therefore, rational for even a conscientious consumer to pay
little, if any, attention to subordinate contract terms.").
For this reason, a number of scholars express skepticism about mandatory
110.
disclosure as a response to delayed terms in the consumer context. See generally Braucher,
supra note 7, at 1810-13 (summarizing debate); Hillman, supra note 87 (describing pros
and cons of forced disclosure).
Il1.
See supra Part II.B.
112.
See Eisenberg, supra note 76, at 242; Meyerson, supra note 25, at 600.
113.
See, e.g., Campbell Soup Co. v. Desatnick, 58 F. Supp. 2d 477, 479 (D.N.J.
1999) (senior executive negotiated terms of original contract of employment and
successfully refused noncompete pursuant to advice of counsel); Earthweb, Inc. v. Schlack,
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be valuable for employees if they result in a stronger bargaining norm. The use of
form documents is often a reflexive act, and questions about their content could
prompt employers to be more flexible, or at least more thoughtful, about how and
when they are used. 14
In a similar vein, mandatory disclosure could make some employers more
hesitant to insist on standard forms containing unfriendly terms for fear of
adversely affecting applicant morale. A disclosure rule forces the employer, in the
course of recruiting a worker, to produce documents that call attention to the risk
that the relationship will go bad, documents that demonstrate not only that the
company has considered that possibility, but that it is making efforts to protect
itself in anticipation of that event. Even if the employee is unlikely to be able to
trade on those terms, producing them introduces considerations that are in conflict
with the tone most employers wish to set in hiring
new staff. This could be enough
15
to make some employers reconsider their use.'
Finally, the disclosure rule advocated here would not stand on its own.
Extensive substantive regulation of both arbitration and noncompete agreements
already exists. As previously discussed, noncompetes are subject to a rule of
reason, and most courts will modify restraints that are deemed too onerous
regardless of the legitimacy of employee assent. In the arbitration context, while
special rules limiting enforcement are federally preempted, courts have paid close
attention to the quality of process afforded under the employer's terms in applying
the defense of unconscionability. 16 In addition, the arbitration industry has
71 F. Supp. 2d 299, 311 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (vice president claimed he noted scope of
noncompete and would not have signed a broader restraint).
114.
I have made it a point of principle to engage in this type of bargaining when
presented with standard forms in connection with my own employment for precisely this
purpose. For instance, I was unable to talk my way out of a consent to criminal and credit

background check presented to me at the start of work, a good year after I had "accepted"
employment. However, I succeeded in bringing the matter to the attention of university
counsel who agreed that such forms will in the future be presented to workers in advance of
employment.
115.
Another possibility is that reputational concerns will check employers' use of
some cubewrap terms. Particularly in a tight area of the labor market, such as technology,
which is characterized by high turnover and a relatively knowledgeable workforce, a
company may be reluctant to maintain a policy of mandatory noncompete agreements. One
can imagine employers attempting to reap a market advantage by not requiring
noncompetes, a prospect that is intuitively more plausible than the notion, advanced in the
consumer context, that manufacturers will advertise favorable fine print terms. See, e.g.,
Clayton P. Gillette, Rolling Contractsas an Agency Problem, 2004 Wis. L. REv. 679, 697.
If employees are readers, however, it is possible that reputational considerations could be
effective in deterring employers from requiring such terms even absent a mandatory prehire disclosure rule.
116.
There are a surprising number of cases striking arbitration clauses as
unconscionable. See, e.g., Parilla v. lAP Worldwide Servs. VI, Inc., 368 F.3d 269, 277-79
(3d Cir. 2004) (holding arbitration agreement imposing thirty-day statute of limitations and
requiring each party to bear its own expenses was substantively unconscionable); Murray v.
United Food & Commercial Workers Int'l Union, Local 400, 289 F.3d 297, 302-04 (4th
Cir. 2002) (holding arbitration agreement giving employer discretion in naming possible
arbitrators and constraining arbitrators' ability to rule on authority of employer's president
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consistently engaged in voluntary self-regulation, articulating rules and protocols
to ensure fairness in employment proceedings.' 17 That is not to say that existing
forms of substantive regulation are ideal or even sufficient. Certainly stronger
methods of intervention could be explored, especially in the noncompete
context. 18 But such efforts can occur in tandem with a disclosure rule. Disclosure
benefiting those employees with options does not undermine the cultivation of
rules aimed at better policing the content of employment agreements on behalf of
those who have no choice." 9
CONCLUSION

The purpose of this Article has been to challenge the legitimacy of
cubewrap contracts as an exercise in private ordering. A review of just some of the
arguments raised in the context of shrinkwrap consumer transactions provides
ample reason to question this method of contracting, and indeed employers'
motives in delaying terms. Although subject to debate, it may well be that
pragmatic considerations justify the practice in the consumer context,
was unconscionable and unenforceable). See generally Jeffrey W. Stempel, Arbitration,
Unconscionability, and Equilibrium: The Return of Unconscionability Analysis as a
Counterweight to Arbitration Formalism, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 757, 766-67
(2004).
117.
See Roberto L. Corrada, Claiming Private Law for the Left: Exploring
Gilmer's Impact and Legacy, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 1051, 1066-68 (1996) (discussing
examples). One can imagine a comparable form of self-regulation on the part of employers
in terms of the appropriate scope of a noncompete restraint. See Arnow-Richman, supra
note 3, at 989-90.
118.
For instance, a simple and effective reform would require employers to pay
an employee his or her salary during the period of noncompetition. Such "gardening leave"
is a standard feature of noncompetition agreements under British Law. See Estlund, supra
note 52, at 425.
119.
Perhaps the most significant limitation of a disclosure regime is not that it
does too little, but rather that if taken to its extreme, it does too much. An inflexible
disclosure rule would not adequately account for situations in which the employer has a
genuine need to implement new, binding terms during the course of a relationship. As
discussed previously, an employee may, in the course of employment, take on new
responsibilities that involve confidential information or customers necessitating a
noncompete; or an employer's strategy toward handling workplace disputes may change,
necessitating an arbitration agreement. A comprehensive treatment of this problem is
beyond the scope of this Article, and I have been careful to limit my recommendation to
situations where disclosure could have been effected prior to hire. However, one possible
way to approach enforcement of standard terms introduced post hire for legitimate reasons
might be to consider the justifications that support delayed term consumer contracts, namely
the needs of the business and the ability of the individual to exit the transaction. In other
words, any mid-employment cubewrap terms should be provided with as much notice as the
practical needs of the business allow, and in all cases with enough time for an employee to
meaningfully consider and reject them. In keeping with the notion in the consumer context
that recipients of shrinkwrap terms have the ability to return the product, meaningful
consideration in the employment context requires an amount of notice sufficient to allow the
employee to "return" the job; that is, quit for alternate employment. This means not only the
opportunity to read the contract or consult an attorney but also enough time to "shop
around" for a new job.
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notwithstanding that a sensible reading of section 2-207 of the U.C.C. prohibits it.
In the employment context, we appear to have the opposite situation. The common
law of contract formation, as it has traditionally applied to employment
relationships, may well recognize delayed terms as valid modifications in that they
are accepted by the employee in exchange for continued employment. But surely
the reality is different. Given the stakes of employment, and the effect of delaying
terms, the use of cubewrap contracts is hardly a form of private ordering so much
as it is a practice of indefensible coercion.
Addressing this problem requires courts and scholars to do some hard
thinking about whether society is content to live with the results of an objective
theory of assent in analyzing the enforceability of cubewrap terms. Such an
undertaking need not wholly upset basic rules of law. Employees obviously are
limited in their ability to bargain over terms of employment no matter what their
form or timing, and for this reason it may be worth pursuing a more complex
theory of assent in such relationships generally. But addressing the dynamic in
question here need not await resolution of that broader inquiry. The use of delayed
terms reflects a deliberate choice of the employer that both exacerbates and
exploits preexisting imbalances. If we mean to preserve private ordering in a form
that deserves the name, at a minimum we must look more critically at the quality
of employee assent to delayed terms, by requiring pre-hire disclosure on penalty of
non-enforcement.

